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Incentive based stormwater management policies offer the prospect of reducing urban 
stormwater runoff while increasing developer profits. An incentive compatible 
Stormwater Banking Program (SBP) is presented that allows developers to build at 
higher residential densities in exchange for including low impact stormwater Best 
Management Practices (BMPs) in the development’s stormwater management 
infrastructure. Price endogeneity presents itself when the smaller residential lots 
created by building at a greater density sell for a lower price than the original, larger 
lots. Stormwater management authorities must be aware of this and the effects of the 
program participation fee structure in designing voluntary incentive based policies that 







Price Endogeneity and Marginal Cost Effects on Incentive Compatible Stormwater 
Management Policies 
Introduction 
Increased urbanization leads to increased stormwater runoff. As more surfaces become 
impermeable to water, storms that result in flooding events become more common. In 
addition, increased stormwater runoff in urban areas carries greater amounts of 
pollutants and nutrient loadings in water supplies. These problems are most frequently 
addressed using conventional regulatory tools such as building density limits and open 
space requirements. Incentive based policies that achieve more stringent runoff 
reduction control objectives and are supported by real estate developers offer the 
opportunity exceed the runoff control performance of the current regulatory approach 
while increasing developer profits and increasing regional water quality. Toward this 
end, a voluntary stormwater banking program (SBP) is developed that allows developers 
to increase building densities in exchange for meeting improved stormwater runoff 
control targets with low impact development (LID) stormwater Best Management 
Practices (BMPs) and paying a participation fee based on the profits earned from the 
higher building density to the SBP. This density bonus permits the developer to build a 
greater number of housing lots, or bonus lots, on the same amount of land as allowed 
under current regulations, resulting in a greater number of smaller housing lots on the 
same amount of land as previously allowed. If the developer chooses to exceed the 2 
 
specified minimum control standard to participate in the SBP through more intensive 
low impact BMP usage, they receive a rebate on the participation fee.   
   As the size of housing lots decrease, ceteris paribus, the price homeowners are 
willing to pay per lot decreases. That is to say that housing lot prices are endogenous. 
The developer has multiple decisions to make. First, is whether or not the additional 
profit from selling the bonus lots is greater than any lost profit due to price endogeneity 
plus the participation fee to enter the SBP plus the cost of installing the low impact 
BMPs. If profits are positive from participating in the SBP, the developer must 
subsequently determine if the reduction in the participation fee is great enough to 
offset the increased BMP costs of achieving a control standard above the minimum 
standard required to participate in the SBP.  
  If the reduction in lot prices is large enough, the developer may have an 
incentive to participate in the SBP, but not fully utilize the density bonus. That is, the 
developer may choose to participate in the SBP, but not build as many lots as allowed by 
the program. Doing so would result in larger, higher priced, lots, a reduction in the 
participation fee, and a reduction in the BMP cost required to meet the SBP standards. 
The participation fee decreases because it is a function of the number of bonus lots. If 
the developer chooses to construct fewer bonus lots, the participation fee decreases. 
BMP costs will decrease because impervious cover is a function of the number of houses 
in a development. If larger lots are used in the development the amount of impervious 3 
 
cover will decrease, the BMP requirements to meet a given site score will decrease and 
BMP costs will decrease. The developer must make the decision of whether or not to 
participate in the SBP and also determine the effects of price endogeneity. Under the 
condition that participation in the SBP is profitable for the developer, this study 
determines how the developer will respond to different policies in order to maximize 
profit. 
  This paper is organized as follows. A review of the literature on stormwater 
BMPs is followed by a detailed explanation of the structure of the SBP and the 
developer’s decisions regarding participation in the SBP and the determination of 
developer profit from the program. An example development in Greenville, South 
Carolina is used to demonstrate how the SBP operates and housing lot sales data is used 
to determine the optimal behavior from a developer’s perspective. Sensitivity analysis 
demonstrates how changing assumptions and changing aspects of the program alter 
developer participation decisions. The paper concludes with recommendations for 
future research. 
Literature Review 
Randall and Taylor (2000) provide an overview of the merits of incentive based 
environmental policies. They emphasize that incentive based policies provide more 
flexibility than command and control policies, and have lower compliance costs. Parikh 
et al (2005) provide a hydrologic, economic and legal framework for examining incentive 4 
 
and market based instruments to reduce stormwater runoff in which they show how a 
voluntary offset program provides an incentive for landowners to reduce runoff with 
low impact BMPs. Thurston et al (2003) examined the control of stormwater runoff 
using tradable allowances based on impervious surface area. They show how the 
possibility of earning revenue from selling excess allowances provides property owners 
with an incentive to build low impact BMPs with greater detention capacity than the 
minimum regulatory requirement. 
  Several studies on the cost effectiveness of various stormwater BMPs have been 
conducted. Brown and Schueler (1997) provide cost estimates for the Mid Atlantic 
states. Wossink and Hunt (2003) derived cost equations and cost estimates for BMP 
construction, maintenance and land costs in North Carolina. Hathaway and Hunt (2007) 
provide a break down of estimated BMP construction costs in North Carolina. Montalto 
et al (2007) examined the cost effectiveness of investments in low impact development 
(LID) for reducing sewer overflows. They found that only under high cost, poor 
performance scenarios is LID not cost-effective relative to combined sewer overflow 
tanks. Landphair (2001) reviewed the cost to performance ratios of several stormwater 
BMPs, finding that infiltration basins tend to be the most cost effective BMPs in terms of 
cost per pound of total suspended solids (TSS) removed in watersheds that are larger 
than 10 acres.  Weiss et al (2007) analyzed the cost effectiveness in terms of suspended 
sediments and total phosphorous for six stormwater BMPs used to treat urban 
stormwater runoff. Using data for installed BMPs from multiple previous studies, they 5 
 
found that if land costs are ignored constructed wetlands are the most cost effective. 
However, in urban environments where land costs are high, less land intensive BMPs 
may be more cost effective. 
Sample et al (2003) evaluated the costs of stormwater BMPs, finding that the 
cost distribution changes when the opportunity cost of land is included. Thurston (2006) 
looks at economic incentives to promote BMPs and includes the opportunity cost of 
land in the analysis. As would be expected, he found that including the opportunity cost 
of land devoted to the BMP increases BMP cost. These two studies found that as the 
price of land within a development increases, less land intensive BMPs, porous 
pavement and green roofs for example, will be used. Thurston (2006) also analyzes the 
effects of using a combination of a mandatory stormwater fee with a voluntary option 
to construct a BMP in exchange for a rebate on construction costs on each parcel in a 
watershed.  He found that the rebate provides the homeowner a positive economic 
incentive to build a BMP if the cost of the BMP minus the rebate is less than the 
stormwater fee.  
Stormwater Banking Program with Price Endogeneity 
The fundamental idea behind the SBP is to align the incentives of stormwater control 
authorities and developers so that stormwater runoff is reduced beyond the current 
regulatory standard, developer profits are increased, and regional water quality 
improves. Under conventional regulatory approaches to stormwater management, 6 
 
developers have an incentive to meet the minimum standard at the minimum cost. 
Under the SBP, the developer has an economic incentive to meet and exceed a higher 
stormwater control standard. 
  Greenville, South Carolina currently specifies area specific density limits for new 
developments. In exchange for relaxing this density limit and allowing more housing lots 
to be constructed on the same amount of acreage, bonus lots, the developer must 
reduce stormwater runoff below the current regulatory standard by the construction of 
low impact BMPs. The developer pays a participation fee to the SBP based on a 
percentage of the profits on the bonus lots.  
  The metric used to determine the level of stormwater runoff reduction is the Site 
Runoff Index Score (site score). The site score is a complex function of factors impacting 
runoff such as impervious cover, soil factors, infiltration factors, sediment factors and 
particulate runoff factors.  Each individual factor is scored on a scale from zero to ten 
and weighted based on its relative importance in determining the amount and severity 
of runoff. See table 1 for an explanation of each factor in the site score and the weight 
assigned to each. A site score of zero implies that all runoff eventually leaves the 
subdivision and adversely impacts regional water quality. A site score of 100 implies that 
the majority of runoff and particulates are trapped within the subdivision and do not 
significantly impact regional water quality. 7 
 
  For Greenville, South Carolina it was determined that a site score of 40 is 
consistent with the effectiveness of the current minimum regulatory standard. 
Subsequently, alternative combinations of low impact BMPs were introduced into the 
stormwater management design for the subdivision and the affect of the BMPs on the 
site score was estimated using the IDEAL computer model. IDEAL is a computer 
simulation model capable of estimating residential stormwater runoff after BMP 
treatment (Barfield et al, 2005). This iterative simulation procedure provided the means 
to determine both appropriate combinations of low impact and traditional BMPs and 
the scale of the BMPs identified to meet a specific higher site score. Once the 
combinations of BMPs and the associated scale level of implementation was determined 
to achieve a specific site score, the data were combined with a collected BMP cost data 
set to estimate the cost of increasing the site score from the regulatory baseline score of 
40 to a higher site score. 
  Given the uncertainty regarding the type of single family residence likely to be 
built on any subdivision lot and/or the final selling price of the house, together with the 
reality that the developer needs to know before any houses are constructed the costs 
and benefits of building at a higher density due to participating in the SBP, expected lot 
price instead of house price is used to estimate likely developer profit from participating 
in the SBP. 8 
 
  Developer profit from participating in the SBP, before considering the additional 
low impact BMP costs and any participation fee rebate is given in equation 1: 
(1)       ) 1 ( ] ) ( % [ c L P P P L NB B NB B B B           , 
where, 
  π:   program profit before possible program rebate and additional BMP costs, 
  LNB:   number of original subdivision lots, 
  LB:   number of bonus lots, 
  PNB:   original lot price, 
  PB:    new lot price at bonus density, 





, 0 ≤ %πB ≤ 1, 
  c:   fraction of density profits paid to the SBP as a participation fee, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1. 
  The first term on the right side of equation 1 reflects the profit to the developer 
from selling the bonus lots. The second term reflects the lost profit to the developer on 
the original lots if there is price endogeneity. If there is no price endogeneity, the bonus 
lots will sell for the same price as the original lots and the second term in equation 1 will 
equal zero.  After any lost profit on the original lots is subtracted from the profit on the 
bonus lots, this density profit is multiplied by the third term, one minus the fraction of 9 
 
density profit paid to the SBP as a participation fee, to determine the program profit 
before any possible rebate on the participation fee and the additional BMP costs are 
considered. 
  The lost profit on the original lots term in equation 1 does not contain a percent 
profit on lot sales such as the first term does. This is because the cost of constructing the 
original lots has not changed. Since the costs to construct the original lots do not change 
with the changing density the only thing that changes is revenue, that is the change in 
price times the number of original lots.  
  We will initially assume that percent profit on the bonus lots is equal to the 
percent profit on the original lots (πB = πNB). However, the percent profit on the bonus 
lots is likely to be higher because the primary infrastructure costs (engineering and site 
design, permits and impact fees, clearing and grading, sewer and water infrastructure, 
and roads) to construct the subdivision have already been incurred. The largest cost 
incurred in constructing the additional lots in an existing subdivision, is connecting the 
lots to sewer and water services. Since the costs to construct the bonus lots are much 
lower, we expect the percent profit on these lots to be higher than for the original lots.   
If the developer chooses to exceed the target site score, the minimum score 
needed to participate in the SBP, through more intensive low impact BMP use, they 
receive a rebate on the original participation fee that assumes they achieved the 
minimum target score. This provides the developer with an economic incentive to 10 
 
voluntarily incur the additional BMP costs necessary to exceed the target site score. The 
rebate formula is provided in equation 2: 
(2)      ) ) ( % ( ) ( NB B NB B B B L P P P L c TSC SC a A            , 
where, 
  A:   rebate on the participation fee, 
  TSC:   target site score to enter the SBP, 
  SC:   site score achieved by the developer, SC ≥ TSC, 
  a:   percent rebate on the participation fee for every point SC exceeds TSC,  
0 ≤ a ≤ 1. 
If the site score equals the target site score, then the rebate is zero.  
  Combining equations 1 and 2 produces equation 3, the program profit before 
incurring the additional BMP costs (π
*): 
(3)            A   
* . 
By subtracting the additional LIDBMP costs (CBMP) from π
* we derive the net program 
profit (Net π
*), equation 4: 
(4)           BMP C Net  
* *   . 11 
 
If equation 4 is positive, the developer has an economic incentive to participate in the 
SBP. In this situation the developer will seek to maximize net program profit subject to 
the conditions imposed for participation in the SBP. 
  The SBP is designed to encourage developers to utilize stormwater management 
methods beyond the common regulatory use of conventional stormwater ponds. 
Developers must also pay close attention to the additional stormwater management 
costs incurred under the SBP. Because the selection of BMPs determines the site score, 
developers will seek the least cost combination of low impact BMPs that will achieve the 
minimum target site score within a given development to participate in the SBP, as 
opposed to making decisions based on familiarity with particular BMPs (Young et al, 
2009). In summary, the proposed SBP program allows stormwater management 
authorities to exceed existing regulatory mandated stormwater runoff goals, while 
developers earn higher profits. Regional water quality improves due to reductions in 
runoff and improvements in nutrient trapping efficiency. In addition, the SBP uses the 
accumulated participation fees to retrofit existing subdivisions that have substandard 
stormwater management systems with low impact BMPs. This provides further regional 
water quality benefits. 
Data and Methods 
Housing lot size and sales price data were collected from the Greenville County, South 
Carolina Geographic Information System (GIS) Division. Data were collected for 12 
 
residential housing lots sales in Greenville, South Carolina from 2004 to 2009.  The S&P 
Case Shiller Home Price Index for Charlotte, North Carolina was used to adjust all sale 
prices to 2009 dollars. Only lot sizes between 0.07 and 0.42 acres were included in the 
analysis. Based on conversations with eight Greenville area residential developers, it 
was determined that 15 percent of the average home price is attributable to lot value. 
Using this information and the current asking prices for new homes in Greenville, it was 
determined that lot sale prices range between $12,000 and $180,000 for the lot sizes 
used in this study. After these restrictions on lot size and lot sale price were imposed, 
277 lots fit the criteria. A centered moving average was constructed to determine 
average housing lot prices for lots between 0.09 and 0.40 acres. Lot price was regressed 
against lot size and it was estimated than an average 0.09 acre lot in Greenville sells for 
$39,500 and that every 0.01 acre increase in lot size increases the lot price by $350. 
Equation 5 was used to determine lot sale price with and without the density bonus in a 
subdivision. Sale price of bonus lots, PB, is calculated as: 
(5)         ) 9 ( 350 $ 500 , 39 $     LS P B , 
where LS is lot size. Both coefficients are significant at 5 percent. Lot size is normalized 
by multiplying the size in acres by 100. So for instance if the lot size is 0.25 acres, then LS 
equals 25. Nine is subtracted from LS because the minimum lot size is 0.09 acres. 
In our discussions with residential developers, we learned that lot prices do not 
vary much with lot size because developers add amenities to increase the value of 13 
 
smaller lots, such as placing the lots closer to parks or green space, to compensate the 
buyer for the smaller lot size. Determining these amenity values is an area for future 
research. Based on discussions with eight Greenville area residential developers, 
developers earn an average profit of 25 percent on each lot. 
  The construction requirements and specifications for both conventional and low 
impact stormwater BMPs were determined using construction plans from the Greenville 
County Storm Water Management Design Manual, January 2003, the North Carolina 
Division of Water Quality Stormwater Best Management Practices Manual, July 2007 
and the Maryland Stormwater Design Manual, Volumes I & II, October 2000. Because 
the modeling tool was developed for Greenville County, South Carolina, Greenville 
County specifications were used whenever possible. 
Cost estimates for thirteen BMPs were developed. Two conventional 
constructed stormwater BMPs, dry ponds and wet ponds, were included in this analysis. 
Unbuildable areas of the subdivision which provide natural filtration are included as a 
conventional BMP in the analysis. There is no construction cost associated with natural 
filtration areas and the cost estimate is zero. Ten low impact stormwater BMPs are 
included in the analysis: bioretention cells, buffer strips, bioswales, infiltration trenches, 
porous pavement, rain barrels, green roofs, wetlands, and sand filters.  Costs to 
construct the BMPs were determined using a combination of data from installed BMPs 
in the Greenville region, component costs from regional sources, and national average 14 
 
costs for components when regional data was unavailable. A standard size was 
developed for each BMP. See table 2 for the cost estimates of each BMP and the 
standard size used. An equation based on the standardized unit cost for each standard 
size BMP was used to scale the construction costs of BMPs implemented at a greater 
scale than the standardized unit size. The marginal cost of BMP construction was 
determined by finding the change in BMP costs required to increase the number of lots 
in the subdivision while maintaining either the target site score or a site score above the 
target site score.    
Example Development 
An example development in Greenville, South Carolina is used to illustrate the benefits 
to the developer of initially entering the SBP at the minimum target site score level, and 
then possibly deciding to exceed the target site score. The relationship between the site 
score, number of bonus lots and lot price, BMP costs and developer profit is 
demonstrated using several scenarios with and without price endogeneity. Sensitivity 
analysis is then performed to determine the impact that changes in important economic 
variables have on developer decision making. 
  Ansley Crossing, a residential development in Greenville, South Carolina, is used 
as the illustration. As shown in figure 1, Ansley Crossing is a 39 acre subdivision, with 11 
buildable acres. Under current density requirements, 38 lots can be built on the 11 15 
 
acres. The remaining 28.7 acres consists of an unbuildable floodplain which is used as a 
natural filtration area. This natural filtration area is maintained throughout the analysis. 
  The baseline scenario for SBP participation involves 38 lots and a site score of 40, 
which reflects the current regulatory standard. Conventional BMPs are used to achieve 
this site score. Other scenarios are used to illustrate the economic costs and benefits of 
(1) achieving the target site score without including the density bonus, (2) achieving the 
target site score with the density bonus, and (3) achieving a site score above the target 
site score with the density bonus. Based upon IDEAL water quality simulations, a target 
site score of 70 was identified as the minimum site score required to participate in the 
SBP. In the representative Ansley Crossing subdivision, achieving a target site score of 70 
allows the developer to construct a maximum of 26 bonus lots. The developer must pay 
50% of the density related profit to the SBP as the participation fee. IDEAL was used to 
determine the lowest cost BMP combination to achieve a given site score in Ansley 
Crossing scenario.  
Table 3 contains the BMP combinations used for the four scenarios considered. 
The baseline scenario uses traditional stormwater BMPs, consisting of a combination of 
28.7 acres of natural filtration area and two dry ponds that total two-tenths of an acre, 
to attain the minimum regulatory required site score of 40.  Scenario 2 achieves the 
target site score of 70, the minimum score necessary to participate in the SBP for the 
original 38 lot subdivision.  The higher site score is achieved by reducing the baseline dry 16 
 
pond area by half, and replacing the lost dry pond area with 18 100 square-foot 
bioretention cells on 18 lots, and a 50 square-foot infiltration trench on the remaining 
20 lots. This results in a total of 1,800 square feet of bioretention cells and 1,000 square 
feet of infiltration trenches within the development.  Scenario 2A achieves the minimum 
target site score of 70 to participate in the SBP for the same subdivision, but at the 
bonus density development level of 64 lots.  With the addition of the 26 bonus lots, the 
BMP plan developed for Scenario 2, must be modified to achieve a site score of 70 at 
the higher building density.  The higher site score is achieved by using three-fourths of 
the baseline dry pond area and adding a 90 square-foot bioretention cell on 32 lots and 
a 50 square-foot infiltration trench on the remaining 32 lots, for a total of 2,880 square-
feet of bioretention cells and 1,600 square-feet of infiltration trenches within the 
development. Scenario 2B was developed to illustrate one set of changes in BMP 
selection and/or intensity that would allow a builder to achieve a site score of 80, 10 
points higher than the minimum site score required for participation in the SBP if the 
subdivision is built to the 64 lot density bonus maximum.  In this situation, three-
quarters of the original baseline dry pond area is retained and a 150 square foot-
bioretention cell is incorporated into 32 housing lots, and a 75 square-foot infiltration 
trench is included in the stormwater management plan for the remaining 32 lots.  In 
total, 4,800 square feet of bioretention cells and 2,400 square feet of infiltration 
trenches are used in Scenario 2B to achieve the site score of 80.  Other BMP 
combinations which achieve a given site score were found, but are not reported due to 17 
 
space limitations. As the number of residential lots increases, impervious surface 
increases and the scale of BMPs necessary to achieve a given site score will increase. 
  Table 4 shows developer profit for six scenarios. The first four scenarios were 
introduced in table 3. In the two new scenarios, 2A* and 2B* are identical to scenarios 
2A and 2B respectively but include price endogeneity. These scenarios provide 
additional information on how developer participation incentives are likely to be 
affected with price endogenous impacts. The baseline scenario reports the BMP cost 
required to achieve the regulatory minimum site score of 40. Scenario 2 illustrates why 
the density bonus is necessary to encourage developers to voluntarily adopt LID BMPs. 
Low impact BMPs are used to attain the target site score of 70. However, without the 
density bonus developers incur increased cost with no economic benefit. 
  Under scenario 2A, the developer attains the target site score of 70 and receives 
the 26 lot density bonus. Using equation 5, and knowing that average lot size is 0.29 
acres when 38 lots are built on 11 acres, average lot price is $46,500. Assuming no price 
endogeneity, the lot price remains $46,500 after the 26 bonus lots are added to the 
development. With the bonus lots, the developer has an economic incentive to 
voluntarily adopt low impact BMPs. Under this scenario, net program profit to the 
developer is $130,882 as reported in Table 4.   
  In scenario 2B a site score of 80 is achieved. To achieve this site score 
stormwater control BMPs must be more intensively used.  To encourage a builder to 18 
 
design a stormwater management plan that achieves the higher site score a rebate on 
the participation fee is used as the carrot.  For every point the site score is above the 
minimum target site score of 70, the developer receives a 2% rebate on the 
participation fee. After receiving the rebate on the participation fee and paying the 
additional BMP cost, net program profit to the developer is $147,974.  Under the 
condition of no price endogeneity, ceteris paribus, the developer would maximize profit 
by entering the SBP and installing more low impact BMPs to obtain the higher site score 
of 80 because it is more profitable to achieve a score of 80 than the minimum 
participation score of 70. 
Under scenario 2A*, which assumes price endogeneity, lot price decreases to 
$42,300 because lots are now 0.17 acres at the higher density. Because the price on all 
lots, including original non density lots has decreased, net program profit under price 
endogeneity is reduced to $37,432, relative to the $130,882 value realized without price 
endogeneity. When the site score is raised to 80 under conditions of price endogeneity 
as reported in scenario 2B*, net program profit is $35,834, which is significantly less 
than profitability was without price endogeneity. With price endogeneity, ceteris 
paribus, the representative developer would participate in the SBP, but would find it 
unprofitable to achieve a site score of 80 because the increased BMP cost of moving 




Net program profit is highly sensitive to the assumptions made regarding model 
parameters. This is clearly visible when comparing the net program profit with and 
without price endogeneity. Because we consider price endogeneity to be the more 
realistic modeling assumption, our sensitivity analysis focuses on scenarios 2A* and 2B*.  
First, we examine the impacts of developer decisions and development cost on net 
program profit if the developer chooses to build fewer than the maximum allowed 
number of bonus lots and/or if the percent profit on bonus lots is higher than for the 
original non bonus lots. Secondly, we examine the impacts on net program profit if the 
SBP alters the participation fee structure by changing the percent of density related 
profit paid to the SBP and/or the rebate percentage on the participation fee per unit the 
site score exceeds the minimum target score to participate in the SBP. 
  Table 5 contains the sensitivity analysis of the number of bonus lots chosen and 
the percent profit on bonus lots. For scenarios 2A* and 2B*, the developer has no 
incentive to increase the site score to 80. In scenarios 3A* and 3B*, when the percent 
profit on bonus lots is increased from 25% to 35%, net program profit is approximately 
three times higher in both cases. In addition, scenario 3B* reveals that if the percent 
profit on bonus lots is 35% the developer has an incentive to increase the site score to 
80. It seems likely that percent profit on bonus lots would be higher than for original 
lots. With price endogeneity, lot prices fall, but the cost of developing the bonus lots 20 
 
falls by a greater degree. Therefore the percent profit on the bonus lots will likely 
increase. 
  Table 5 also reports four additional scenarios in which the developer chooses to 
build 55 lots in the subdivision as opposed to the maximum allowed number of 64. With 
fewer lots, average lot size increases and the new lot price is $43,350. For scenarios with 
a site score of 70, BMP cost is decreased by $778 per available bonus lot that is not 
developed. For scenarios with a site score of 80, BMP cost is decreased by $1,283 per 
available bonus lot that is not developed. In all four scenarios, 4A* through 5B*, net 
program profit is lower than under the comparable scenarios when 64 lots are built and 
the percent profit on bonus lots is the same. The increase in lot price for the larger lots 
would need to be much larger to justify not building the maximum number of bonus lots 
allowed under the program. 
  The SBP would like to both encourage developers to participate in the program 
and to voluntarily achieve site scores that exceed the target site score. To this end, the 
percent of density profits paid as a participation fee and the rebate for exceeding the 
target site score can be altered. Table 6 contains the sensitivity analysis for this. 
Comparing scenarios 2A* and 2B* to scenarios 6A* and 6B* we see that decreasing the 
percent of density profits paid as a participation fee from 50 percent to 40 percent 
increases profits and will increase the incentive to participate in the program. However, 
even if the share of density profit paid to the SBP as a participation fee is decreased 21 
 
from 50% to 40% there is still not a sufficient incentive to increase the site score to 80, 
as net program profit under 6A* is greater than under 6B*. Comparing scenarios 2A* 
and 2B* to scenarios 7A* through 8B*, in which the rebate for the exceeding the site 
score has been increased from 2% to 4% for each point the site score is beyond the 
minimum target site score of 70, we find developers have an incentive to increase the 
site score to 80. So if the objective is to increase developer participation in the program, 
the percent of density profits paid as a participation fee should be decreased. If the 
objective is to encourage more developers to achieve a site score above the target site 
score, the rebate for exceeding the target site score should be raised. 
 Conclusion 
Incentive based policies hold promise to reduce stormwater runoff in urban areas and 
improve regional water quality by aligning the incentives of regulators and residential 
developers. The proposed incentive based SBP allows developers to build at a higher 
density in exchange for adopting low impact stormwater best management practices. 
An example development in Greenville, South Carolina was used to demonstrate how a 
policy of this type could both increase developer profit and reduce stormwater runoff 
beyond current regulatory standards. In the presence of lot price endogeneity, it was 
shown that developer participation decisions are highly sensitive to the percent profit 
on bonus lots, the percent of density profits paid as a participation fee and the rebate 22 
 
for exceeding the target site score. Policy makers must be aware of this when designing 
stormwater management policies and setting developer participation objectives. 
One area for future research is to develop a more extensive model of housing lot 
prices which includes characteristics on location, school quality, and amenity values. 
Developers informed us that they generally charge the same price for all lots within a 
subdivision. To compensate the buyers of smaller lots, they locate smaller lots in 
proximity to parks or include other amenities to provide equal value to the buyers of 
larger and smaller lots. Determining these location and amenity values will give us a 
better idea of the how lot size affects residential lot price. Another area for future 
research is estimating the value of regional water quality improvements produced by an 
incentive compatible urban stormwater management policy. 23 
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Table 1. Factor Weights for Computing Site Score 
Factor  Weight  Based On  Explanation 
Runoff Factor  1.5  Natural land cover  Function of surface 
area 
Soil Factor  1  Impermeable area  Reflects soil texture, 
permeability and 
impervious surfaces 
Detention Factor  1.5  Impervious area 
connected to drainage 
Based on runoff speed; 
varies with amount of 
impervious area 
connected to drainage 
Infiltration Factor  1  Area draining through 
BMPs 
Dependent on 
percentage of area 
draining through BMPs 




Nitrogen Factor  1  IDEAL Nitrogen TE  Reflects measures that 
reduce nitrogen runoff 
Phosphorous Factor  1  IDEAL Phosphorous TE  Reflects measures that 
reduce phosphorous 
runoff 
Bacteria Factor  0.5  IDEAL Bacteria TE  Reflects measures that 
reduce bacteria runoff 
Maintenance Factor  1  Who performs 
maintenance and 
frequency 
Considers if BMPs 
require maintenance 
and who performs it 
Note: Trapping Efficiency (TE) is the percentage of effluent kept on site. Each factor is 
scored on a scale of zero to 10. The factor scores are weighted and summed into a total 
site score. The site score is between zero and 100. A site score of 40 is consistent with 
the effectiveness of BMPs selected to satisfy current stormwater regulatory 
requirements in Greenville County. 
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Table 2. BMP Standardized Unit Size and Associated Unit Construction Cost 
BMP Practice  Size  Cost 
Bioretention Cell  500 ft
2  $3,120 
Natural Filtration  1 Acre  $0 
Infiltration Trench  100 ft
2  $555 
Buffer Strip  100 ft
2  $6 
Bioswale  100 ft
2  $279 
Dry Pond  ¼ Acre  $12,575 
Wet Pond  ¼ Acre  $16,215 
Wetland  1000 ft
2  $8,009 
Porous Pavement  100 ft
2  $810 
Sand Filter  100 ft
2  $3,490 
Green Roof  100 ft
2  $1,732 
Rain Barrel  55 gallons  $200 
Note: Total costs for each selected BMP exceeding the standardized unit size are scaled 
up  by  the  following  formula.  For  BMPs  implemented  at  a  scale  greater  than  the 
standardized unit size but at a scale not exceeding four standardized units, total BMP 
cost for the given practice is the standardized cost for the first unit plus 85 percent of 
the standardized unit cost for the number of units beyond the first unit. The total cost 
estimate for constructed BMPs at least four times larger than the standardized size is 
the cost of constructing the first four units plus 80 percent of the standardized unit cost 













Table 3. BMP Selection and Scale by Management Scenario 
  Baseline  Scenario 2  Scenario 2A  Scenario 2B 
BMP Practice  Area  Area  Area  Area 
Bioretention Cell  0.0  1800.0  2880.0  4800.0 
Natural Filtration  28.7  28.7  28.7  28.7 
Infiltration Trench  0.0  1000.0  1600.0  2400.0 
Buffer Strip  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Bioswale  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Dry Pond  0.2  0.1  0.15  0.15 
Wet Pond  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Wetland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Porous Pavement  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Sand Filter  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Green Roof  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Rain Barrel  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Site Score  40  70  70  80 
Number of Lots  38  38  64  64 
Note: The units for all BMP areas are reported in square feet except for rain barrel 
(gallons),  natural  filtration  (acres),  dry  pond  (acres),  and  wet  pond  (acres).  Baseline 
assumes a site score of 40 and 38 residential lots. Scenario 2 reports BMPs necessary to 
achieve a site score of 70 with 38 residential lots. Scenario 2A reports BMPs necessary 
to achieve a site score of 70 with 64 residential lots. Scenario 2B reports BMPs necessary 
to achieve a site score of 80 with 64 residential lots. The same combination of BMPs in 












Table 4. BMP Cost, Effective Participation Fee and Developer Profit by Management 
Scenario with and without Price Endogeneity 
    Fixed Price  Price Endogeneity 
BMP Practice  Baseline   SC 2  SC 2A  SC 2B  SC 2A*  SC 2B* 
Bioretention Cell  $0  $10,015  $15,469  $25,053  $15,469  $25,053 
Natural Filtration  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Infiltration Trench  $0  $4,629  $7,290  $10,837  $7,290  $10,837 
Buffer Strip  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Bioswale  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Dry Pond  $10,060  $5,030  $7,545  $7,545  $7,545  $7,545 
Wet Pond  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Wetland  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Porous Pavement  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Sand Filter  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Green Roof  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Rain Barrel  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0  $0 
Total Cost  $10,060  $19,674  $30,303  $43,436  $30,303  $43,436 
             
Site Score  40  70  70  80  70  80 
             
Additional BMP Cost  NA  $9,614  $20,243  $33,376  $20,243  $33,376 
             
Number of Lots  38  38  64  64  64  64 
             
Lot Price  $46,500  $46,500  $46,500  $46,500  $42,300  $42,300 
             
Participation Fee  ---  NA  $151,125  $151,125  $57,675  $57,675 
             
Participation Fee Rebate  ---  NA  NA  $30,225  NA  $11,535 
             
Effective Participation Fee  ---  NA  $151,125  $120,900  $57,675  $46,140 
             
Program  Profit  before 
Potential  Participation  Fee 
Rebate  and  Additional 
BMP Cost 
           
---  NA  $151,125  $151,125  $57,675  $57,675 
             
Net Program Profit  ---  -$9,614  $130,882  $147,974  $37,432  $35,834 
Note:  All  cost,  benefit  and  profit  measures  are  calculated  relative  to  the  baseline 
scenario. Scenario 2 has a zero program profit before subtracting additional BMP cost to 
the achieve the target site score of 70 because there is no SBP  in place to  reward 
developers  that  implement  management  plans  beyond  the  minimum  regulatory 
requirements to achieve a site score of 40. In scenarios 2A* and 2B*, Net Program Profit 
is calculated by subtracting Additional BMP Cost from Program Profit before Potential 
Participation Fee Rebate and Additional BMP Cost and adding the rebate, the difference 
between the Participation Fee and the Effective Participation Fee. 30 
 
Table 5. Sensitivity Analysis of the Affect that the Number of Lots, Lot Price and the 
Percent Profit on Bonus Lots have on Net Program Profit 
Scenario  Site Score 
Number of 







Baseline  40  38  $46,500  NA  NA 
Scenario 2A*  70  64  $42,300  25%  $37,432 
Scenario 2B*  80  64  $42,300  25%  $35,834 
Scenario 3A*  70  64  $42,300  35%  $92,422 
Scenario 3B*  80  64  $42,300  35%  $101,822 
Scenario 4A*  70  55  $43,350  25%  $19,043 
Scenario 4B*  80  55  $43,350  25%  $16,912 
Scenario 5A*  70  55  $43,350  35%  $55,890 
Scenario 5B*  80  55  $43,350  35%  $61,129 
Note: Price endogeneity is assumed for all scenarios. Additional BMP cost for all “A*” 
scenarios are the same as for scenario 2A*and additional BMP cost for all “B*” scenarios 
are the same as for scenario 2B*. For the “A*” scenarios with 55 lots, BMP costs are 
decreased by $778 per lot for every lot less than 64. For the “B*” scenarios with 55 lots, 









Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis of the Affect of that the Percent Density Profit Paid as a 
Participation Fee and the Percent Rebate on the Participation Fee per Point the Site 
Score exceeds the Target Site Score 
















Baseline  40  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Scenario 2A*  70  50%  2%  NA  $37,432 
Scenario 2B*  80  50%  2%  $11,535  $35,834 
Scenario 6A*  70  40%  2%  NA  $48,967 
Scenario 6B*  80  40%  2%  $9,228  $45,062 
Scenario 7A*  70  50%  4%  NA  $37,432 
Scenario 7B*  80  50%  4%  $23,070  $47,369 
Scenario 8A*  70  40%  4%  NA  $48,967 
Scenario 8B*  80  40%  4%  $18,456  $54,290 
Note:  Price endogeneity is assumed for all scenarios. Additional BMP cost for all “A*” 
scenarios are the same as for scenario 2A*and additional BMP cost for all “B*” scenarios 









Figure 1. Ansley Crossing Development 
 
 
 